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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 59-1-602, 78-2-2 and 63-46b-14 (1953 as amended). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. ISSUE FOR REVIEW: Did the Commission err in relying on Utah 
Admin. Code R861-1A-21.B (1998) ("Rule 2 LB") to decide that it could impose an 
increased severance tax based on a split decision of the Commission when the controlling 
statute does not permit the Commission to act unless a majority of the Commissioners 
concur? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This is a legal issue to which there has 
been no explicit statutory grant of discretion given to the Commission to interpret the 
subject statutory provisions. Accordingly, this legal issue is to be reviewed under a 
correction of error standard giving no deference to the determination made by the 
Commission. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610 (1953 as amended)1; Atlas Steel. Inc. v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n. 61 P.3d 1053, 1057 (Utah 2002); Nebeker v. State Tax Comm'n. 34 
P.3d 180, 186 (Utah 2001); and Salt Lake Citv Southern R.R. Co.. Inc. v. State Tax 
Comm'n. 987 P.2d 594, 596 (Utah 1999). 
' Unless otherwise indicated, all citations to the Utah Code Annotated are to the 
1953 edition as amended. 
1 
PRESERVED FOR APPEAL: The Commission's Final Order on 
Reconsideration is based on its determination that the Commission may act with a 2-2 tie 
vote of the Commissioners and that the Division was the prevailing party. (R. at 34 and 
see R. at 240 and 174). 
2. ISSUE FOR REVIEW: If the Court upholds Rule 21 .B, did the 
Commission err in not recognizing ExxonMobil as the prevailing party when Utah law 
requires the Division to overcome the statutory presumption against taxation and the 
Division failed to convince a majority of the Commissioners that its statutory 
interpretation was correct? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This is a legal issue to which there has 
been no explicit statutory grant of discretion given to the Commission to interpret the 
subject statutory provisions. Accordingly, this legal issue is to be reviewed under a 
correction of error standard giving no deference to the determination made by the 
Commission. Id. 
PRESERVED FOR APPEAL: The Commission's Final Order on 
Reconsideration is based on its determination that the Commission may act with a 2-2 tie 
vote of the Commissioners and that the Division was the prevailing party. (R. at 34 and 
see R. at 240 and 174). 
3. ISSUE FOR REVIEW: Did the Commission err when it concluded 
that the language, "shall pay to the state a severance tax equal to 4% of the value, at the 
2 
well, of the oil or gas produced," means that Utah's severance tax should be imposed at 
the point oil and gas is sold rather than when it is severed from the earth? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This is a legal issue to which there has 
been no explicit statutory grant of discretion given to the Commission to interpret the 
subject statutory provisions. Accordingly, this legal issue is to be reviewed under a 
correction of error standard giving no deference to the determination made by the 
Commission. Id. 
PRESERVED FOR APPEAL: The Commission's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Final Decision is based on its interpretation of the severance tax 
statutes. (R. at 279 and see R. at 364 and 559). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
determinative of issues in this appeal. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610: 
(1) When reviewing formal adjudicative proceedings 
commenced before the commission, the Court of Appeals or 
Supreme Court shall: 
(a) grant the commission deference concerning 
its written findings of fact, applying a substantial 
evidence standard on review; and 
(b) grant the commission no deference 
concerning its conclusions of law, applying a 
correction of error standard, unless there is an explicit 
grant of discretion contained in a statute at issue 
before the appellate court. 
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(2) This section supercedes Section 63-46b-16 
pertaining to judicial review of formal adjudicative 
proceedings. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-205: 
The governor shall designate one of the members of 
the commission as chairperson. Three members of the 
commission constitute a quorum for the transaction of 
business. The commission shall be in session and open for 
the transaction of business during ordinary business hours 
each day. The commission may hold sessions or conduct 
investigations at any place in the state to facilitate the 
performance of its duties. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-102(l)(a): 
Each person owning an interest, working interest, 
royalty interest, payment out of production, or any other 
interest, in oil or gas produced from a well in the state, or in 
the proceeds of the production, shall pay to the state a 
severance tax equal to 4% of the value, at the well, of the oil 
or gas produced, saved, and sold or transported from the field 
where the substance was produced. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-101(19): 
"Value at the well" means the value of oil or gas at the 
point production is completed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-101(20): 
"Well or wells" means any extractive means from 
which oil or gas is produced or extracted, located within an 
oil or gas field, and operated by one person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-103(1): 
For purposes of computing the severance lax, the 
value of oil or gas at the well is the value established under 
4 
an arm's-length contract Ibi the pui chase of production at the 
well, or in the absence of such a contract, by the \ alue 
established in accordance with the first applicable of the 
following methods: 
(a) the value at the well established under a 
non-arm's-length contract for the purchase of 
production at the well, provided that the value is 
equivalent to the value received under comparable 
arm's-length contracts for purchases or sales of like-
quality oil or gas in the same field; 
(b) the value at the well determined by 
consideration of information relevant in valuing like-
quality oil or gas at the well in the same field or nearby 
fields or areas such as: posted prices, prices received 
in arm's-length spot sales, or other reliable public 
sources of price or market information; 
(c) the value established using the net-back 
method as defined in Section 59-5- i 01 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-101(7): 
"Net-back method" means a method tor calculating the 
fair market value of oil or gas at the well. Under this method, 
costs of transportation, not to exceed 50% of the value of the 
oil or gas, and processing shall be deducted from the 
proceeds received for the oil or gas and any extracted or 
processed products, or from the value of the oil or gas or any 
extracted or processed products at the first point at which the 
fair-market value for those products is determined by a sale 
pursuant to an arm's-length contract or comparison to other 
sales of those products. Processing and transportation costs 
shall be deducted only from the value of the processed or 
transported product. 
Utah Admin. Code R861-1A-21 (1998): 
\ \ quorum of the commission must participa i 
any order which constitutes final agency action on an 
adjudicative matter. 
5 
B. The party charged with the burden of proof or the 
burden of overcoming a statutory presumption shall prevail 
only if a majority of the participating commissioners rules in 
that party's favor. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
L NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This case is an appeal of a decision of the Utah State Tax Commission 
regarding which party prevails in the event the four member Commission renders a split 
decision. Petitioner is appealing both the validity of the administrative rule relied on by 
the Commission to declare the Division the prevailing party and the Commission's 
alleged misapplication of that rule. Because the Commission ruled that its split decision 
resulted in a victory for the Division, Petitioner is also appealing the Commission's legal 
interpretation of Utah's Severance Tax Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-5-101 through 215 
(the "Act"). 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION AT UTAH 
STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
In September 1999, ExxonMobil discovered that it had mistakenly 
calculated its Utah severance tax by using the value of its oil and gas at delivery points 
that were significantly downstream2 from the well site. (R. at 280). On 
2
 Oil and gas is severed from the earth at the well site. The oil and gas may be 
separated at the well site and sold or it may be transported through gathering lines to 
satellite facilities and then to battery facilities where further refining, separating and 
treating may occur. The oil and gas may also be sold at the satellites or batteries, or may 
be further transported to refineries or other locations through pipelines. Satellites, 
6 
September j . \ i ''**' I ^MUH' Inlnl i n L in pulled a refund of excess severance taxes it 
bel^ joiieously paid during the period from Janu.r * ] Q93 through 
December 31,1998 (the "Audit Period"). (R. at 281). On May .. 
issued a Statutory Notice in which it denied I/AAOHII \U > • !' • -<ou 
and JKI) LXMHIMCI'I' imuT Hni ;i peMMnii in which it requested that the Commission 
(«i I inlerpivl the severance tax statutes to determine at what point oil and gas production 
is "at the well" for Utah severance tax purposes, and (b) determine the value of 
ExxonMobil's oil and gas at whatever poii in was deemul in In ilu ruinvf pnn i for 
valuau 2001, the Commission entered an Order in 
which It bifurcated the two issues. (R. al 573). 
On December 18, 2001, the Commission conducted a ioniu 
receive evidence and legal argumeiu on d< llisi i I^M inerpiviinu the statutory meaning 
il 19, 2002, the Commission issued its 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision ("Final Decision") on the first 
bifurcated issue. (R, at 279) The Commissioners were not uniform m llien 
interpretation of the severance ... . missioners wrote a 
separate npiun m "! i unnussioner Pam Hendrickson wrote the opinion of the Commission 
and Palmer DePaulis wrote a concurrence. Commissioners Hendrickson and DePaulis 
batteries and pipelines are generally referred to as "downstream locations. See 
Statement of Facts, infra pp. 1 <»- -". 
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concluded that the statute was ambiguous and that oil and gas "production is complete" 
when it is sold. Thus, they rejected ExxonMobil's interpretation that oil and gas 
production was complete when it was severed from the earth at the well. Commissioners 
Hendrickson and DePaulis concluded that the point of valuation for severance tax 
purposes could be at various different locations wherever the production was sold. 
Commissioners R. Bruce Johnson and Marc B. Johnson3 disagreed with Commissioners 
Hendrickson and DePaulis and concluded that the statute was not ambiguous and that oil 
and gas production was complete when the oil or gas was "produced or extracted" from 
the earth at the well site. (R. at 279). The Commission named the Division the 
prevailing party. 
On May 8, 2002, ExxonMobil filed a Request for Reconsideration of the 
April 19,2002 Decision claiming that a tie vote of the four Commissioners should be 
interpreted in the taxpayer's favor and that ExxonMobil should be declared the 
"prevailing party." The Request also asserted additional errors in the Commission's 
3
 Commissioner Marc B. Johnson agreed with the statulory interpretation set forth 
"by Commissioner Bruce Johnson in his dissenting opinion." (R. at 294). He advocated 
a prospective application of the statutory interpretation. On reconsideration, 
Commissioner Marc B. Johnson abandoned this prospective application position and 
fully joined "in Commissioner Bruce Johnson's dissent." (R. at 36). 
8 
jxl conducted a hearing on the reconsideration •, \ 
September 19,2002. (R. at 35). 
On October 11, 2002, the Commission issued i: i 
Reconsideration Phnal < Htha I in v, In. !i i( iniflirninl ' - f 'h it the Division was 
. . l d t v a j u e «at t j i e ^ eji» referre(| t 0 t ^ e v a i u e af the 
point of sale. (R. at 34). The Commission also directed the continued proceeding in the 
matter on the second bifurcated issue. (R. at 34). 
OnDecembeM
 4nu IIH i nimmsMnii mini der of Summary • 
Jtiiliiinciil i HI llu' vivond bifurcated issue in which it concluded that the values used b\ 
ExxonMobil in its original severance tax filing were the prices of the oil and gas at the 
multiple sales points. (R. at 5). Because the Commission nau ; 
'Value at the well meant llu; punil nl «,(,ilr i,i(liii lli.in ,i ' II 11 le <it the point of extraction 
ant) i'*\rniiKi1 I"M ("ommission determined that no refund was due to ExxonMobil and 
the agency case was then complete. 
On December 16, 2002, ExxonMobil timely filed HMII I i I1'." n"11 
with this Com i. 
4
 On May 17, 2002, the Commission granted Phillips Petroleum Company's 
motion for leave to file an amicus brief in support of ExxonMobil's Request for 
Reconsideration (R at 203), 
9 
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
The issues presented in this case are purely legal issues and matters of 
statutory interpretation. Therefore, there are no disputed factual issues presented by this 
appeal The basic uncontested facts as set forth by the Commission in its Final Decision 
are as follows: 
1. ExxonMobil, owns or operates between 400 to 600 producing oil 
and gas wells in the Ratherford and McElmo Creek production areas in the Greater 
Aneth Field located in the southeast corner of Utah. (R. at 282). 
2. "The production process for oil and gas first begins at the 
production zone below the earth's surface." Id. 
3. "Oil, water and gas emulsion is produced from the production zone 
and is extracted and severed from the earth at the wellhead on the surface of the earth." 
14 
4. "At the point the oil comes from the ground, it is in an emulsion 
containing water, oil, sand, and other impurities referred to as basic sediment and water 
("BS&W")." Id 
5. "The oil, water and gas emulsion severed at the wellhead is 
frequently referred to as 'total production.1" 14 
6. "In a simple situation, the total production is placed into a simple 
storage and/or separator tank at the well site where the BS&W is allowed to settle to the 
10 
f» ul the tank. ' I he gas is flared off" or 
otherwise separated and gathered for gas processing." i R at 2^ ~ j 
7 "Trucks could load oil from the simple storage tank at which \ 
could be sold and then transported hv inu (*• M» .I leiiiia ' lor (iinlini irfiiiiiiL! " JL^  
t sold at the well site, it could be transported 
further to a Satellite Facility ("Satellite") where additional heating, treating and 
separating could occur." Id 
(ill and jzas could In; ;.,uld hum (In Siilrllni. 10 ,i liurk lo.id mil 
14 
10. "If the oil was not sold at the Satellite, it could be further transferred 
to a Tank Battery Facility ("Battery") for even further refining, separating, treating . i 
storage." IdL 
1 1 . " "1 lie oil 'ould be metered at [the Battery] and loaded out to a ti uck 
or sold into a pipeline." Id 
12. "The oil is marketable at the well *.te. UK. ViiemK ,;!;.. - r 
(R at 285). 
13. The value of oil and gas at the well site where the production is 
severed from the earth is generally less than the value of the oil and gas at downstream 
"There are a number of wells in Utah, which are not owned by ExxonMobil, 
that have simple storage tanks set up at the well and they sell their production through a 
truck load-out at the well site." (R. at 284), 
11 
delivery points after processing makes the oil and gas a more refined and valuable 
product. Id. 
14. "During the Audit Period, ExxonMobil sold a small percentage of 
its oil from individual well sites" and a larger percentage at the Battery. (R. at 283-284). 
15. In September 1999, ExxonMobil discovered that it had mistakenly 
calculated its Utah severance tax by using the value of its oil and gas at delivery points 
that were significantly downstream from the well site. (R. at 280). 
16. On September 23, 1999, ExxonMobil timely requested a refund of 
the excess severance taxes it had erroneously paid. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This appeal involves three main issues: (1) may the Commission impose i 
tax based on a split decision when the controlling statute does not permit Commission 
action unless a majority of the Commissioners concur, (2) did the Commission err in 
declaring the Division the prevailing party when the Division did not overcome the 
statutory presumption against taxation because it failed to convince a majority of the 
Commissioners that its interpretation was correct, and (3) what is the correct 
interpretation of the meaning of "value at the well" as used in Utah's Severance Tax Act? 
If the Court determines that ExxonMobil should have been declared the prevailing party 
in the administrative proceeding under either of the first two issues then the Court need 
not reach the third issue interpreting Utah's Severance Tax Act. 
12 
E * tl^ ^ s!im: nartv at the adminis t ra t ive 
proceeding. At the adminis t ra t ive p roceed ing , E x x o n M o b i l sough! ..• \
 c a l interpretation 
that severance tax should b e imposed on the va lue of oil and gas "at the well'" i a ther than 
on the increased value o f t h e oil and gas alKi il luil lii/rii IIMHIM IMIIII Il mil MHIII HI 
dovuislreani |pc:itM» I i >i \\\r < 't HUPHIVStoners ruled that the tax should be imposed at 
the wel l and two ruled that it should be imposed at the point o f sale. Utah law provides 
that the Commiss ion may only act through a majority vote o f its Commissioners. Thus, 
the decis ion o f the L o\ nmissioners cannot 1 > e 11»11 s 11II i • 111 I • 111 11t il I 111t < i»1111111 s «•, mi 11 
a i itli :)i: izliig the imposition of SG\ ei ance tax at the higher valuation amount, and 
ExxonMobi l ' s interpretation should prevail until a majority o f t h e Commiss ion decides 
that the tax may be imposed at the point o f sale 1 he Commiss ion refused to accept 
result and asserted thai it was auf l io t i /n l l», us own .liliiiiiiisti.ifh c nil I I d i h \ i l i i n 
< though it could only achieve a tie vote . It is well 
established that an administrative rule cannot circumvent the requirement o f t h e 
governing s tatute. A s a result, the Commiss ion cannot avoid the statutory requirement o f 
a majority decision by l r \n ig lo es lahhsh ,i "cssn \ ini i1 slaml \!\l , l in , , i n l i i n 
- 1 .B should thus be stricken as unauthorized under Utah C o d e 
Ann. § 59 -1 -205 and ExxonMobi l should be declared to be the prevailing party. 
Assuming arguendo m ^ K „ : , .. .B is upneia ana tounu 
-. oui , .
 Jt •• '
}
 -•- ••• ^burden 
13 
of overcoming a statutory presumption" set forth in the rule. Rule 21 .B provides that the 
"party charged with the burden of proof or the burden of overcoming a statutory 
presumption shall prevail only if a majority of the participating commissioners rules in 
that party's favor." This case involves a legal question of statutory interpretation. Thus, 
there is no factual "burden of proof' on either party, but instead a "burden of overcoming 
a statutory presumption." The issue presented here is the interpretation of the severance 
tax statute. It is well established under Utah law that taxing statutes are to be interpreted 
in favor of taxpayers and against taxation. Thus, it is the Auditing Division, not 
ExxonMobil, that bears a "burden of overcoming the statutory presumption" against 
taxing oil and gas at the higher valuation point. The Division only obtained two votes 
and thus did not overcome this presumption. The Court should reverse the 
Commission's decision that the Division was the prevailing party. 
As to the correct interpretation of the meaning of "value at the well" as 
used in Utah's Severance Tax Act, Commissioner Pam Hendrickson's and Palmer 
DePaulis' decisions did not follow the established rules of statutory construction: (1) to 
look first to the plain meaning of the language, (2) to ensure that the interpretation is in 
harmony with the statutory provisions as a whole, and (3) to interpret ambiguities in tax 
statutes in favor of the taxpayer. When these standard rules of construction are applied, 
as they were by Commissioners R. Bruce Johnson and Marc B. Johnson, it becomes clear 
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that "production is complete" at the well and not at a point of sale that may be 
significantly downstream. 
ARGUMENT 
I. ADMINISTRATIVE RULE 2 LB RELIED ON BY THE 
COMMISSION TO DECLARE THE DIVISION THE PREVAILING 
PARTY IS UNENFORCEABLE BECAUSE IT CONFLICTS WITH 
THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT THAT THE COMMISSION 
ACT AS A QUORUM TO ENFORCE TAX OBLIGATIONS. 
The Tax Commission is a creature of statute and only has those powers 
which are conferred upon it by statute. E.C. Olsen Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 168 P.2d 
324, 328 (Utah 1946). Utah law requires that all actions by the Commission be 
performed by a quorum of the Commissioners. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-205. According 
to the Utah Supreme Court, this means "when four commissioners of the Tax 
Commission are present, three must agree to constitute an act of the Commission." E.C. 
Olsen Co.. 168 P.2d at 328 (emphasis added). Rendering a decision as to the tax liability 
of the petitioners constitutes an act whether the petitioner is seeking a refund or the 
Division is seeking enforcement of an assessment. 
On December 18, 2001, the Commission sat as a full body and conducted a 
formal hearing in this matter. The issue before the Commission was whether the Utah 
law imposing severance tax required the amount of tax to be based on the value of the oil 
and gas when it is severed from the earth at the well, as argued by ExxonMobil, or 
whether it should be based on the value of the gas where it is actually sold, as argued by 
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the Division. Two of the Commissioners agreed with ExxonMobil's interpretation of the 
statute and the other two adopted the Division's position. 
Under § 59-1-205 and E.C. Olsen Co., ExxonMobil should have been 
named the prevailing party. Only two of the Commissioners believed that the Division 
was correct in its interpretation of the statute. Agreement by only two commissioners 
does not constitute a quorum and a tax cannot be enforced where the Commission has 
failed to act as a quorum. E.C. Olsen Co., 168 P.2d at 328. 
Despite the absence of a quorum, the Commission named the Division as 
the prevailing party. This conclusion was not based on the governing statute, but on the 
administrative rule which directly conflicts with the governing statute. Rule 21 reads as 
follows: 
A. A quorum of the commission must participate in any 
order which constitutes final agency action on an 
adjudicative matter. 
B. The party charged with the burden of proof or the 
burden of overcoming a statutory presumption shall 
prevail only if a majority of the participating 
commissioners rules in that party's favor. 
Utah Admin. Rules R861-1 A-21. According to the Commission, Rule 21 .B dictated that 
"Petitioner would need three commissioners to find in its favor in order to prevail." 
Final Order, p. 4. (R. at 35). 
This Court has long held that administrative rules which conflict with their 
governing statutes are unenforceable. Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit Division of Utah 
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State Tax Comm'n. 846 P.2d 1304, 1306 (Utah 1993); Merrill Bean Chevrolet, Inc. v. 
State Tax Comm'n. 549 P.2d 443, 445 (Utah 1976); Robert H. Hincklev. Inc. v. State 
Tax Comm'n. 17 Utah 2d 70, 77, 404 P.2d 662, 668 (1965). Moreover, an agency 
cannot alter the effect of a statute by adopting administrative rules which purport to 
interpret a statute. Sanders Brine Shrimp. 846 P.2d at 1305 ("Questions of statutory 
construction are matters of law, and we give no deference to an administrative agency's 
interpretation of a statute.").6 
Before 1998, the administrative rule adopted pursuant to § 59-1-205, and in 
effect for more than twenty years, provided that in the event of a tie, "the position of the 
petitioning taxpayer will be deemed to have prevailed." This rule appears to have been 
consistent with the governing statute because it required an act by a quorum of the 
Commission before it could impose or enforce a tax liability. Despite the fact that there 
had been no change to the governing statute, the Commission amended the rule in 1998, 
effectively changing the outcome in cases resulting in a tie vote. 
In a recent open meeting before the Legislature's Administrative Rules 
Review Committee, one of the Commissioners admitted that there is no statutory 
authority for this amendment: 
Committee Member: Can you show us in the statute where 
you have the authority to say tie goes to the tax assessor? 
6
 A court will only defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute when the statute 
contains "an explicit grant of discretion." Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-610(l)(b). 
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Tax Commissioner R. Bruce Johnson: The statutes are pretty 
much silent on that. There's a provision that says if the 
petitioner, the taxpayer, doesn't bring any evidence forward 
on equalization that the property would be deemed to be 
equalized. But other than that, pretty much it's, the statutes 
are silent. 
Administrative Rules Review Committee Meeting, (January 14, 2003). 
The governing statute simply does not provide the agency with discretion 
to alter, by rule, which party will be the prevailing party in the event of a tie. 
Nevertheless, in this case the Commission has applied Rule 21 .B to deprive ExxonMobil 
of the victory it would have had under § 59-1-205. In its Final Order, the Commission 
admitted that the clear result under the former rule was that ExxonMobil would have 
been the prevailing party: 
This leads to the issue of which side prevails in the event of a 
tie among the Commissioners. Prior to 1998, the Tax 
Commission rules were clear as to which party prevailed in 
the event of a tie. Utah Admin. Rule R861-1 A-5(E) (1997) 
stated in pertinent part,' If the Commission vote results in a 
tie vote on any matter, the position of the petitioning taxpayer 
[ExxonMobil] will be deemed to have prevailed . . . . 
Final Order, p. 3 (R. at 37).7 
7
 It should be noted that the tax at issue in this matter is for the tax years 1993 
through 1998. Thus, the "old rule" was the rule in place during five of the six years at 
issue. The old rule read as follows: 
"all formal adjudicative proceedings will be decided by a 
quorum of the commissioners.... If the Commission vote 
results in a tie vote on any matter, the position of the 
petitioning taxpayer will be deemed to have prevailed, and 
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The governing statute does not give the Commission discretion to change 
the outcome of an agency proceeding by amending its rules. The governing statute 
requires a majority vote to impose an increased tax. Because the rule conflicts with the 
governing statute and is unauthorized, it is unenforceable and should be stricken. 
IL THE COMMISSION ERRED WHEN IT NAMED THE DIVISION 
THE PREVAILING PARTY BECAUSE THE DIVISION, NOT 
EXXONMOBIL, BORE THE BURDEN OF OVERCOMING A 
STATUTORY PRESUMPTION. 
Even if the Court concludes that Rule 21.B is harmonious with the 
governing statute, the Commission erred in concluding that ExxonMobil did not prevail 
because it bore "the burden of proof or the burden of overcoming a statutory 
presumption." Rule 21.B implicitly acknowledges that issues before the Commission fit 
within two categories: (1) legal issues where a statute is presumed to favor either the 
taxpayer or the taxing entity, or (2) factual issues where one party is charged with the 
burden of proof. The "burden of overcoming a statutory presumption" and the "burden 
of proof' are not the same thing. Nevertheless, the Commission used the terms 
interchangeably, ultimately reaching the wrong conclusion.8 
the Commission will publish the decision." 
Utah Admin. Code R861-1 A-5.E (1993-1997). 
8
 On page 4 of the Final Order, the Commission held, "It is the Commission's 
conclusion from the briefing and oral argument on this issue that Petitioner is the party 
charged with the burden of proof or the burden of overcoming a statutory presumption." 
(R. at 37). 
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The Commission held that ExxonMobil did not prevail because (1) it was 
"the party seeking affirmative relief," and (2) "the issue of [at] what point the oil and gas 
is to be valued for severance tax purposes is a question of both law and fact." (R. at 38). 
The first basis for the Commission's conclusion appears to be grounded in 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-604, a procedural statute governing judicial review of 
administrative proceedings which requires the "parties seeking affirmative relief to bear 
the burden of proof.9 Not only is § 59-1-604 inapplicable to the proceeding before the 
Commission, but § 59-1-610, a related statute, requires that the Commission's decision 
be given no deference when a legal issue is under review. Thus, there is no "burden of 
proof even at the appellate level in matters of statutory interpretation. Instead, there is a 
statutory "presumption" which either favors or disfavors the party seeking a correct 
interpretation. 
The issue of statutory interpretation before the Commission in this case is --
what is the correct interpretation of "value at the well." ExxonMobil characterized this 
issue as a question of law because it is a straightforward issue of statutory interpretation. 
The Commission concluded, without explanation, that "the issue of what point the oil 
9
 In Salt Lake City Southern R.R. Co., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 987 P.2d 594 
(Utah 1999), this Court interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-604 to require a taxpayer to 
bear the burden of proof only when the taxpayer was challenging the Commission's 
factual findings. The Commission was given no deference on matters of statutory 
interpretation or "questions of law." In fact, the only exception to that rule is when the 
statute being interpreted contains "an explicit grant of discretion." Id. at 596, n. 2, 
quoting Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-610(l)(b). 
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and gas is to be valued for severance tax purposes is a question of both law and fact." 
Final Order, p. 5. The only way the issue could be one of fact and thereby merit a lesser 
standard of review is if the statute contained "an explicit grant of discretion." Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-l-610(l)(b). Because there is no explicit grant of discretion to the 
Commission, the interpretation of "value at the well" is a legal issue subject to traditional 
rules of statutory construction. 
Utah law is well-established that, in matters of statutory interpretation, tax 
statutes are always construed liberally in favor of the taxpayer. Industrial 
Communications. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 12 P.3d 87, 91 (Utah 2000)(As a 
"general rule [the] tax statutes and any ambiguities therein are to be construed liberally in 
favor of the taxpayer."); County Bd. of Equalization of Wasatch County v. Utah State 
Tax Comm'n. 944 P.2d 370, 375 (Utah 1997), quoting, Salt Lake County ex rel. v. State 
Tax Comm'n ex reL 779 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1989)("Our practice is to construe 
taxation statutes liberally in favor of the taxpayer, leaving it to the legislature to clarify an 
intent to be more restrictive if such intent exists.").10 
Despite this well-established statutory presumption in favor of the taxpayer, 
the Commission concluded that ExxonMobil bore a "burden of proof' because, 
10
 The only exception to this rule of statutory presumption is where a taxpayer 
claims the benefit of an exemption. In those cases, the presumption is in favor of 
taxation. Butler v. State Tax Comm'n. 13 Utah 2d 1, 367 P.2d 852 (Utah 1962). No 
such exemption claim is involved in this case. 
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regardless of the correct statutory interpretation, ExxonMobil would be required to pay 
some severance tax: 
[Cjlearly the severance tax is applicable, that is not the 
dispute. The dispute is what point in the production process 
should the oil and gas be valued in order to determine the 
amount of the severance tax . . . . [I]t is the Commission's 
conclusion that the issue of what point the oil and gas is to be 
valued for severance tax purposes is a question of both law 
and fact. 
Final Order, p. 5 (R. at 38). The fact that a taxpayer will have some liability under a 
taxing statute does not alter the statutory presumption. 
In Chris & Dick's Lumber and Hardware v. Tax Comm'n, 791 P.2d 511 
(Utah 1990), the taxpayer challenged the Commission's interpretation of a statute 
imposing a penalty for the late filing of prepayments related to its sales tax returns. The 
Commission levied a ten percent penalty of almost $10,000 on the taxpayer's late 
payment. The taxpayer argued that the statutory language "10% . . . due from the date 
the prepayment return is due" created an interest charge of less than $1,000. Even 
though the taxpayer would have some liability under either interpretation, the Court 
recognized that this issue of statutory construction was a "matter[] of law for the courts." 
Id at 513. 
Just like the taxpayer in Chris & Dick's, ExxonMobil is seeking an 
interpretation of statutory language. Despite the fact that ExxonMobil will pay severance 
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tax under either interpretation of "value at the well/' Utah law still recognizes a 
presumption in favor of the taxpayer: 
It is an established rule in the construction of tax statutes that 
if any doubt exists as to the meaning of the statute, our 
practice is to construe taxation statutes liberally in favor of 
the taxpayer leaving it to the Legislature to clarify an intent to 
be more restrictive if such intent exists. 
County Bd. of Equalization of Wasatch County, 944 P.2d at 375. Because 
ExxonMobil's interpretation would only reduce rather than eradicate its tax liability, the 
Commission, without any legal precedent, chose to ignore the statutory presumption 
favoring the taxpayer and held that ExxonMobil had failed to meet its "burden of proof." 
The Commission based its decision that ExxonMobil bore the burden of 
proof on Butler v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 367 P.2d 852 (Utah 1962). However, Butler 
expressly recognizes that the taxing entity bears the burden of proving the applicability of 
a taxing statute. Once this burden has been met, the Court explained that "[t]he burden 
then shifted to the plaintiff to prove the transactions came within the exemptions as it 
claims." IdL at 854 (emphasis added). ExxonMobil's contention that it is entitled to a 
refund of severance taxes paid does not depend on a tax exemption. Accordingly, the 
burden never shifted to the taxpayer. Instead, the Division continues to bear the burden 
of overcoming the statutory presumption in favor of taxpayers. County Bd. of 
Equalization of Wasatch County. 944 P.2d at 375. 
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Under the administrative rule relied on by the Commission to declare the 
Division the victor in the proceeding below, the Division bore the burden of overcoming 
the statutory presumption. The Division was only able to persuade two Commissioners 
to agree with its interpretation of the severance tax statute. Rule 21 .B requires a majority 
of three before the Division can be declared the prevailing party. Because two 
Commissioners concluded that the Division failed to overcome the statutory 
presumption, ExxonMobil should be declared the prevailing party in this matter and the 
opinions of Commissioners R. Bruce Johnson and Marc B. Johnson should be viewed as 
the decision of the Commission on the bifurcated issue. 
III. IF THE COURT DOES NOT CONCLUDE THAT EXXONMOBIL IS 
THE PREVAILING PARTY, THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE 
THE COMMISSION'S RULING THAT "VALUE AT THE WELL" 
MEANS THE "POINT OF SALE" BECAUSE THIS RULING 
VIOLATES THE RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. 
In this matter, the Commission interpreted the meaning of Utah's severance 
tax statutes. This Court has previously ruled that a statutory interpretation by the 
Commission constitutes "a conclusion of law [to which] we grant no deference and 
review for correctness." Atlas Steel Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 61 P.3d 1053 (Utah 
2002). When the Court conducts a review such as this, it applies the following standard 
rules of statutory construction: 
1. The Court looks "first to the plain language of the statute." County 
Bd. of Equalization of Wasatch County, 944 P.2d at 373 (citations omitted). 
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2. The Court interprets the "terms of a statute . . . as a comprehensive 
whole and not in piecemeal fashion." Business Aviation of South Dakota. Inc. v. 
Medivest Inc.. 882 P.2d 662, 665 (Utah 1994). 
3. "[I]f any doubt exists as to the meaning of the statute, 'our practice 
is to construe taxation statutes liberally in favor of the taxpayer, leaving it to the 
legislature to clarify an intent to be more restrictive if such intent exists.'" County Bd. of 
Equalization of Wasatch County. 944 P.2d at 373-374, quoting, Salt Lake County v. 
State Tax Comm'n. 779 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1989). 
A review of the Commission's Final Decision reveals that it did not apply 
these standard rules of construction in its analysis of the subject statute. Moreover, the 
Commission's interpretation results in disparate treatment of similarly situated taxpayers 
by imposing severance tax at the wellhead in some instances, while in other instances it 
would impose the tax downstream where the value of oil and gas is higher because it 
includes costs of processing and/or transportation. 
A. The Plain Language of the Severance Tax Act Requires That 
ExxonMobil's Oil and Gas Production Be Valued "At the Well." 
Rather than at Some Other Downstream Point of Sale. 
The first crucial point which provides context for this issue is that the tax at 
issue in this case is a severance tax, not a sales tax. In contrast to a sales tax which is 
calculated on a sales price which may include manufacturing, transportation and other 
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costs, a severance tax is imposed on the value of a product when it is "severed" or 
separated from the earth whether it is sold or not.11 
The plain language of the Act requires that severance tax be imposed on 
the 'Value" of oil and gas "produced" and not on the "sales price" of oil and gas "sold:" 
"severance tax [shall be] equal to 4% of the value, at the 
well, of the oil and gas produced" 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-102(l)(a)(emphasis added). "Value at the well" is defined as 
"the value of oil or gas at the point production is completed." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-5-1021(19). The Final Decision adopted by the Commission reflects a 
misunderstanding of the nature of the severance tax and the Legislature's plain use of the 
word "production." 
According to the Commission, the Legislature "defined 'at the well' to 
mean something other than simply the well or well site" because the Legislature used the 
phrase "at the point production is completed." Final Decision, p.l 1 (R. at 289). 
However, if one reviews the provisions of the Act, it is clear that the Legislature uses the 
word "production" synonymously with the word "extraction" to refer to the process of 
severing the oil or gas from the earth. For example, "well" is defined as "any extractive 
11
 Severance taxes are "usually regarded as a form of property taxation" that is 
imposed on petroleum and mineral production "at the time they are removed or severed 
from the soil." Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1233 (5th Ed. 1979); and H. William and C. 
Meyers, Manual of Oil and Gas Terms, p. 1013 (9th ed. 1994) (severance tax is "a tax on 
the removal of minerals from the ground"). "Severance" means the "the act or process of 
severing." The American Heritage Dictionary, p. 627 (1983). 
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means from which oil or gas is produced or extracted, located within an oil or gas field, 
and operated by one person."12 Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-101(20) (emphasis added). 
ExxonMobil asserts that the plain meaning of these provisions clearly provides that the 
oil or gas should be valued for severance tax purpose when it is "produced" and that 
under the definition of Subsection-20 that is at the "well." 
The plain meaning of "production" is the "act of producing," and in this 
context "producing" means to extract or "bring out" by "physical effort." Merriam-
Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, p. 648 (Deluxe Ed. 1998).13 Accordingly, one is 
"producing" oil or gas when he is physically extracting or bringing the oil or gas out of 
the earth where it had been captured in the reservoir. When is the "act of producing" 
(i.e., production) complete? Quite simply, when the oil or gas is liberated or severed 
from the earth at the well, hence the name "severance tax." It is "at the well" that the oil 
or gas is no longer physically attached with the earth and it becomes a separate item of 
12
 Black's Law Dictionary defines "well" to mean "[a] hole or shaft sunk into the 
earth in order to obtain a fluid, such as water, oil, brine, or natural gas, from a 
subterranean supply." Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1430 (5th Ed. 1979); see also 
Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, p. 2098 (Deluxe Ed. 1998)("a shaft or hole 
sunk to obtain oil, brine or gas"), and H. Williams and C. Meyers, Oil and Gas Law. Vol. 
8, p. 1205 (Lexis Publishing 2000)("An orifice in the ground made . . . for the purpose of 
obtaining any petroleum or gas."). 
13
 According to Webster, "extract" means: "to withdraw (as a juice or fraction) by 
physical or chemical process," and "produce" means "to compose, create, or bring out by 
intellectual or physical effort." See Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, pp. 648 
and 1459. 
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tangible property capable of separate ownership, transportation and alienation.14 
Centennial Oil Co. v. Federal Power ComnTn. 266 F.2d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. 
denied, 361 U.S. 827 (1959)("[I]n the ordinary sense of the terms production of the gas 
has been completed at or just above the surface of the ground.") (emphasis added). 
Not only did the Commission's Final Decision fail to apply the plain 
language standard, but it also ignored its own prior decision that followed this plain 
language. In Appeal No. 88-1676, the Commission was asked to review whether an 
arm's-length contract for the purchase of oil and gas at a point away from the wellhead 
could be used as the actual value of the oil and gas for purpose of the severance tax. The 
Commission rejected the use of this third party contract because it did not establish the 
value of the oil and gas at the "top of the wells:" 
[The Act] requires the value of oil and gas to be set at the 
well.... Under the clear and literal meaning of [the Act], at 
the well means the gross value of those products at the point 
of their removal from the well It does not mean the price 
obtained at some point downstream after deducting costs 
incurred for transportation, fractionation, and marketing fees. 
The position of the Petitioners also does not account for 
'shrinkage,' or product which is lost in the process, because 
the quantities which are sold are smaller than the quantities 
which come through the meters at the top of the wells. 
14
 See Utah Attorney General Informal Opinion No. 82-06, p. 5 (Sept. 2, 1982) 
(extraction of oil and gas at the wellhead is the time at which oil and gas is produced and 
becomes a "commodity" to which "title vests"), citing Wall v. United Gas Public Serv. 
Co.. 152 So. 561 (La. 1934). 
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Appeal No. 88-1676, p. 4 (Utah State Tax Comm'n 1990) (emphasis added).15 As 
evidenced by this case, the severance tax is not a tax on the value at a point of sale, 
wherever that may be. The severance tax is imposed on the value of the oil and gas at the 
moment it is extracted from the earth. 
The Utah Court of Appeals decision in Belnorth Petroleum Corp. v. Tax 
Comm'n, 845 P.2d 266 (Utah App.), cert denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993) also 
supports the interpretation that production is complete "at the well" and not at some place 
further downstream. In Belnorth, the Court of Appeals ruled that severance tax 
reimbursements received by a well operator as part of a contractual sales price are not to 
be included in the value of the oil and gas production "at the well." The court clarified 
that "value at the well" only means the value of the oil and gas production "itself." 
"Value at the well" is not equal to a contractual purchase price that may compensate the 
seller for other values received for post production costs such as severance taxes, 
transportation costs, gathering costs, etc. 14 at p. 270. 
Based on the plain language of the statute, the "production" of oil and gas 
is "complete" when it is "severed" or "extracted" from the earth. Accordingly, the point 
of valuation is the point of severance which is at the mouth of the well before any post 
production processes and costs are applied. 
15
 A copy of this appeal is attached hereto in the Addendum. 
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B. The Commission's Decision That"Value at the Well" Means the 
"Point of Sale" Is Not in Harmony w ith Other Provisions of the 
Severance Tax Act. 
The Commission's Final Decision ignores other provisions of the Act and 
renders them meaningless. For example, Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-103 "Valuation of oil 
and or gas." Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-103 provides that the "value of oil or gas at the well 
is the value established under an arm's-length contract for the purchase of the production 
at the well." If there is no such arm's-length contract, however, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-5-103 identifies three additional valuation methods that may be used to try to 
identify the value of the oil and gas at the well: 
(a) the value at the well established under a non-arm's-
length contract for the purchase of production at the well, 
provided that the value is equivalent to the value received 
under comparable arm's-length contracts for purchases or 
sales of like-quality oil or gas in the same field; 
(b) the value at the well determined by consideration 
of information relevant in valuing like-quality oil or gas at the 
well in the same field or nearby fields or areas such as: posted 
prices, prices received in arm's-length spot sales, or other 
reliable public sources of price or market information; 
(c) the value established using the net-back method as 
defined in Section 59-5-101.16 
If the Commission's interpretation is correct that the oil and gas should be 
valued at the "point of sale," why would any of the above valuation methods be 
16 The "'net-back method' means a method for calculating the fair market value of 
oil or gas at the well. Under this method, costs of transportation . . . and processing shall 
be deducted from the proceeds received for the oil or gas and any extracted or processed 
products [at their downstream sales location]." Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-101(7). 
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necessary? They would not be. One would just wait until they sell their production, and 
there would be no need to try to estimate the value of the oil or gas back to the point it 
was produced at the well.17 
The Commission's "point of sale" interpretation is not consistent with this 
provision of Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-103 and thus violates the rule of statutory 
construction that requires that the interpretation not be "piecemeal" and that it be in 
harmony with all of the provisions of the statute. Morton International Inc. v. Auditing 
Division of the Utah State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 581, 591 (Utah 1991)(A "rule of 
statutory construction . . . provides that terms of a statute are to be interpreted as a 
comprehensive whole and not in a piecemeal fashion."); see also Business Aviation of 
South Dakota. Inc. v. Medivest. Inc., 882 P.2d 662, 665 (Utah 1994). 
C. If the Court Determines That the Severance Tax Act Is 
Ambiguous. Utah Law Requires That the Act Be Interpreted 
Liberally in Favor of the Taxpayer. 
"In case of doubt," taxing statutes are "construed in favor of the taxpayer 
so as to avoid the levying of taxes by implication." Belnorth. 845 P.2d at 271, n.8. If the 
Commission had any doubt about the meaning of Utah's severance tax statutes, those 
doubts should have been construed in favor of ExxonMobil and against the Division: 
17
 The Commission's interpretation that oil and gas should be valued at the "point 
of sale" in essence converts the severance tax into a sales tax. By making the severance 
tax a sales tax, all of the statutory provisions relating to "value" of the oil or gas are 
rendered meaningless because a sales tax does not care about value, but only the "sales" 
or "transaction" price. 
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It is an established rule in the construction of tax statutes that 
if any doubt exists as to the meaning of the statute, our 
practice is to construe taxation statutes liberally in favor of 
the taxpayer leaving it to the Legislature to clarify an intent to 
be more restrictive if such intent exist. 
County Bd. of Equalization of Wasatch County v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 944 P.2d at 
374; see also Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153 (1917)("In the interpretation of statutes 
levying taxes, it is the established rule not to extend their provisions, by implication, 
beyond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge their operation so as to 
embrace matters not specifically pointed out. In case of doubt they are construed most 
strongly against the government, and in favor of the citizen."). 
The Commission concluded that the statute was ambiguous because the 
Legislature did not define the phrase "production is completed." (R. at 289). Rather 
than apply long-standing principles of statutory interpretation to interpret this alleged 
ambiguity, the Commission concluded that the Legislature was "tacitly leaving it up to 
the Tax Commission . . . to interpret the phrase." Id (emphasis added). The 
Commission then deferred to its Division's interpretation that the production of oil and 
gas was not complete until it was "actually sold" and concluded that the Division's 
interpretation was "a permissible interpretation and not unreasonable" particularly in 
light of "past administrative practices" by the Division. Id. 
When there is an ambiguity in a statute, as the Commission concluded there 
was in this case, Utah law requires courts to interpret the ambiguities in favor of the 
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taxpayer. County Bd. of Equalization of Wasatch County. 944 P.2d at 374. The 
Commission acknowledged that ExxonMobil's interpretation was "well-reasoned." (R. 
at 291). Yet it rejected ExxonMobil's interpretation of the statute because the Division's 
interpretation was "also reasonable and permissible" and was "the one that has been in 
use for more than ten years." Id (emphasis added).18 
This act by the Commission completely ignored the fact that Utah law 
requires an "explicit grant of discretion" from the Legislature before the Commission 
may accept its own "permissible interpretation" of an ambiguous provision. Atlas Steel. 
Inc.. 61 P.3d at 1057. If there is no "explicit grant of discretion," the Commission must 
abide by "the general rule that tax statutes and any ambiguities therein are to be 
construed liberally in favor of the taxpayer." Industrial Communications. Inc.. 12 P.3d at 
91. Furthermore, the Division's practices had never been reviewed by the Commission 
prior to ExxonMobil's appeal and thus could not be characterized as representing the 
Commission's "long-settled position" or "policy." (R. at 298).19 Because the 
18
 Ironically, rather than clarify alleged ambiguity, the Commission's decision 
creates ambiguity and uncertainty within the Severance Tax Act. Because the 
Commission concluded that production is complete at the point of sale, in some instances 
that "completion" occurs as soon as the oil and gas is extracted from the well simply 
because it is sold there. On the other hand, refined oil and gas is somehow "incomplete" 
upon removal from the same well as oil and gas sold at the wellhead because it is going 
to be sold at a downstream location. Thus, by focusing on point of sale, the 
Commission's decision has removed all certainty and meaning from the phrase 
"production is completed." 
19
 Commissioner R. Bruce Johnson explained, "[W]e have been cited no cases 
that would indicate that the Division's position was ever approved by the Commission. 
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Commission ignored cardinal rules of statutory interpretation and gave unwarranted 
deference to the Division's own practices, the Court should reverse the Commission's 
Decision. 
D. The Commission's Interpretation That Production Is Completed 
at the Point of Sale Results in Disparate Tax Treatment of 
Similarly Situated Taxpayers and Potentially Violates Utah's 
Constitution, 
As noted in Commissioner R. Bruce Johnson's Dissent, the Commission's 
"interpretation does not promote fairness and equity": 
Two barrels of oil from the same field with identical 
characteristics would be taxed differently if their owners had 
different marketing strategies. The owner who chose to add 
value by further processing its product would be penalized 
with a higher tax burden. Such disparate treatment of 
similarly situated taxpayers should be avoided unless the 
legislature clearly intends to treat them differently. 
Final Decision, p. 19 (R. at 297). Without a clear legislative intent and a rational basis to 
treat such taxpayers differently, this type of disparate tax treatment would violate Utah's 
constitutional provisions of equal protection and uniform operations of the laws. See 
Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 796 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1990). 
Utah has long followed the "policy to interpret a statute if possible to avoid 
potential constitutional conflicts." Cole v. Jordan School District, 899 P.2d 776, 777 
(Utah 1995). Consequently, the Court should also reject the Commission's statutory 
The lack of published opinions or guidance makes it unlikely that the legislature could be 
deemed to be aware of the Division's position." (R. at 298). 
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interpretation in this case because the Commission has shown no legislative intent for the 
resultant disparate tax treatment and because such a rejection would avoid a potentially 
unconstitutional interpretation of the statute. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, ExxonMobil respectfully requests that the Court 
enter a decision declaring that the Commission's Rule 2LB is invalid because it is 
inconsistent with Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-205 and that ExxonMobil's interpretation 
adopted by Commissioner R. Bruce Johnson and Marc B. Johnson is the prevailing 
interpretation of the definition of "at the well." 
In the alternative, ExxonMobil requests that the Court enter an order 
declaring that under Rule 21 .B, the Division bore the burden of "overcoming a statutory 
presumption" that the severance tax statutes are to be interpreted in favor of the taxpayer, 
ExxonMobil, and that the Division did not overcome this presumption when it failed to 
obtain the votes of more than two Commissioners. Thus, ExxonMobil's interpretation of 
"value at the well" is the prevailing interpretation. 
Finally, if the Court does not rule in ExxonMobil's favor on the tie vote 
issues, ExxonMobil requests that the Court apply the standard rules of statutory 
construction and enter a decision reversing the Commission's conclusion that "value at 
the well" means "the point of sale," and ruling that production is completed when the oil 
and gas is severed from the earth at the well. 
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DATED this 12th day of March, 2003. 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
MM 
David J/Crapo Attorneys for Appellant 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission for a Formal Hearing on 
December 18, 2001. The hearing was limited to the bifurcated factual and legal issue of what point 
the oil and gas was "at the well" for purposes of Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-5-102(l)(a). 
This matter was originally filed before the Commission by Petitioner on June 9,2000 
as an appeal of Respondent's denial to issue a refund of severance tax. On July 2, 2001, Petitioner 
filed a Motion to Bifurcate issues in this matter. Respondent opposed the motion. The motion was 
granted in part on August 2,2001, when the Commission ordered that the matter proceed to a Formal 
1 
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Hearing on the bifurcated issue of what point in time the oil was "at the well." The Formal Hearing 
was scheduled solely for the purposes of hearing this bifurcated issue. At the hearing, Respondent 
objected that the matter had been scheduled for a Formal Hearing and requested that it be converted 
to an Initial Hearing. Respondents request was denied. 
Based upon the pleadings, evidence and testimony presented, the Commission makes 
the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The tax at issue in this appeal is Utah's severance tax on oil and gas. Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 59-5-101 through 59-5-119. 
2. The period at issue is January 1, 1993 through December 31, 1998. 
3. During the period at issue ExxonMobil operated multiple wells in the 
Rutherford and McElmo Creek production areas which are located in the Greater Aneth Field in 
Southeast Utah. ExxonMobil Hearing Exhibit No. 3 and Formal Hearing Transcript ("Transcript"), 
p. 57. 
4. For purposes of Utah's severance tax, the Division has assigned account 
number 7370 to ExxonMobil for its oil and gas production from the Greater Aneth Field. Statutory 
Notice, p. 1. 
5. ExxonMobil asserts that during the period at issue it mistakenly calculated its 
Utah severance tax for account number 7370 by applying the severance tax to the value of its oil and 
gas at delivery points that were significantly downstream from the well site. 
2 
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6. The downstream delivery point used for the oil was at the pipeline after the oil 
left the battery and passed through the Lease Automatic Custody Transfer meter (aLACTM). The 
downstream delivery point used for the gas was at the tailgate of the processing plant. 
7. ExxonMobil asserted that the value of the oil after the LACT and the value of 
the gas at the tailgate are higher than the value "at the well." 
8. In calculating the severance tax in its original return, ExxonMobil did not 
deduct certain costs that had been added to the value of the oil and gas that ExxonMobil now asserts 
were post production costs. ExxonMobil had valued the oil based on arms-length sales on the 
original returns. 
9. ExxonMobil recalculated its severance tax by subtracting those costs from the 
value of the oil and gas at the point of delivery so as to determine the value of the oil and gas 
production "at the well." 
10. On or about September 23, 1999, ExxonMobil timely submitted its revised 
calculations to the Division and requested a refund of a portion of the severance tax it had previously 
paid. 
11. On May 10, 2000, the Division issued a Statutory Notice in which it denied 
ExxonMobil's refund request. 
12. ExxonMobil timely filed a Petition for Redetermination challenging the 
Division's Statutory Notice. 
13. At the Formal Hearing, ExxonMobil called one witness, Mr. Jeffrey A. 
Lambert, an ExxonMobil employee who was certified as an expert petroleum engineer. Transcript, 
3 
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p. 40. The Division called three witnesses: Mr. John Baza, a petroleum engineer and Associate 
Director of Oil and Gas for the Utah Division of Oil, Gas and Mining; Inge-Lise Goss, a Tax 
Manager in the Division; and Bradley Simpson, a former Deputy Director of the Division. 
Transcript, p. 220 (Mr. Baza), Transcript, p. 247 (Ms. Goss) and Transcript, p. 254 (Mr. Simpson). 
14. There are approximately 400 to 600 producing oil and gas wells in the 
McElmo and Rutherford Units. Transcript, p. 57 (Mr. Lambert). The average depth of the 
production zone for these oil and gas wells is approximately 5,000 to 6,000 feet below the earth's 
surface. Transcript, p. 43 (Mr. Lambert). 
15. The production process for oil and gas first begins at the production zone 
below the earth's surface. See Hearing Exhibit No. 2. 
16. Oil, water and gas emulsion is produced from the production zone and is 
extracted and severed from the earth at the wellhead on the surface of the earth. Transcript, pp. 45-
46 (Mr. Lambert) and Transcript, p. 235 (Mr. Baza). At the point the oil comes from the ground, it is 
in an emulsion containing water, oil, sand, and other impurities referred to as basic sediment and 
water ("BS&W"). It may also contain various gases including hydrogen sulphide, helium, and 
natural gas. Transcript, p. 263-264. 
17. The oil, water and gas emulsion severed at the wellhead is frequently referred 
to as "total production." Transcript, p. 44 (Mr. Lambert) and Transcript, p. 227 (Mr. Baza). 
18. For purposes of this decision, we use the term "well" as being synonymous 
with "wellhead" and "well site," unless the context indicates otherwise. 
4 
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19. Typically the mouth of the well will be covered by a valve structure 
commonly referred to as a "Christmas Tree". Transcript, p. 44 (Mr. Lambert). The emulsion that 
comes from the well is almost never sold directly from the Christmas Tree. There is generally some 
separation either in a simple storage tank or further refining. 
20. In a simple situation, the total production is placed into a simple storage 
and/or separator tank at the well site where the BS&W is allowed to settle to the bottom of the tank 
with the oil rising to the top tank. The gas is flared off or otherwise separated and gathered for gas 
processing. Transcript, p. 48 (Mr. Lambert). 
21. Trucks could load oil from the simple storage tank at which point it could be 
sold and then transported by truck to a refinery for further refining. Transcript, pp. 121 and 188 (Mr. 
Lambert). 
22. If the oil was not sold at the well site, it could be transported further to a 
Satellite Facility ("Satellite") where additional heating, treating and separating could occur. 
Transcript, p. 53 (Mr. Lambert). Oil and gas could be sold from the Satellite to a truck load-out. 
Transcript, p. 54. 
23. If the oil was not sold at the Satellite, it could be further transferred to a Tank 
Battery Facility ("Battery") for even further refining, separating, treating and storage. The oil could 
be metered at a LACT and loaded out to a truck or sold into a pipeline. Transcript, pp. 54-55. 
24. During the Audit Period, ExxonMobil sold a small percentage of its oil from 
individual well sites in the Rutherford Unit to Giant. Hearing Exhibits 8, 9 and 10. 
5 
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25. However, the majority of ExxonMobil's production from the Rutherford and 
McElmo Creek units was sold to the pipeline or at the pipeline and not at the individual well sites. 
Transcript p. 148. 
26. For that small percentage of product purchased by Giant at the individual well 
sites, some was transported via truck to Giant's Bloomfield Refinery in New Mexico. Other amounts 
of product purchased at the well site were trucked to Giant's Aneth receiving point where the crude 
oil was placed into Giant's pipeline and transported to one of Giant's processing facilities. See 
Hearing Exhibit 8, 9 and 10. 
27. When Giant purchased the oil at the well site the price was the Paradox Basin 
Sweet Posted Price reduced for: gravity adjustments, treating fees (based upon the percentage of 
BS&W), transportation charges, split load fees, and short load fees. See Exhibit 7 through 10. For 
example, in Exhibit No. 9, ExxonMobil established that on September 27, 1998, it sold crude oil 
from a well in the Rutherford Unit. The starting Paradox Basin Posted Price was $12.79 a barrel. 
This price was adjusted by a reduction of $0.06 for gravity. It was further reduced by $1.25 for a 
BS&W adjustment and was also reduced by $2.15 for a transportation fee to Giant's refinery at 
Bloomfield, New Mexico. The net price paid by Giant for the crude oil was $9.29 at the well. See 
Exhibit No. 9 and Transcript, pp. 105-110. 
28. There are a number of wells in Utah, which are not owned by ExxonMobil, 
that have simple storage tanks set up at the well and they sell their production through a truck load-
out at the well site. Transcript, p. 227 (Mr. Baza); Transcript, p. 250 (Ms. Goss); and Transcript, p. 
6 
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283 (Mr. Simpson). A well operator could choose to invest additional capital to further refine the oil 
by moving it from the well to a Satellite or a Battery. Transcript, pp. 230-233 (Mr. Baza). 
29. Petitioner does not have permanent well site tanks at any well in the 
Rutherford and McElmo Creek areas. Instead, for that small percentage of oil that Petitioner sells at 
the well site, the oil was sold from portable tanks called frac tanks which were used occasionally for 
testing or if there had been some disturbance to the normal process. Transcript p. 95-96. 
30. The simple tank set up at the well is part of the well site, but neither the 
Satellite nor the Battery are part of the well site. Transcript, p. 244 (Mr. Baza). 
31. A well could be operated by one person, but a Satellite or Battery would 
generally require multiple people to operate them. Transcript, p, 236 (Mr. Baza); see also Transcript, 
pp. 202-204 (Mr. Lambert). 
32. The oil is marketable at the well site, the Satellite and the Battery. Transcript, 
pp. 233-234 (Mr. Baza). The price paid for oil at the well site might be less than the price paid for 
oil at the Battery because there is usually "additional processing" to the oil to get a more refined 
product at the Battery. Transcript, pp. 230-231 (Mr. Baza). 
3 3. When operators sell their production at the well site, it has been Respondent's 
longstanding position that the operators pay severance tax on the lower adjusted posted price paid at 
the well site. Transcript, p. 250 (Ms. Goss); and Transcript, p. 284 (Mr. Simpson). 
34. If the operator sold oil at the well site that is where Respondent considered the 
production to be complete and Respondent based the severance tax on the value at that point. It was 
Respondent's position that production was not complete at the well site, however, if the operator 
7 
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chose not to sell at the well site, but rather, moved the oil to a Satellite or Battery for sale. 
Respondent's position is that production is completed at the point of the sale and Respondent relies 
on the sales contract to determine the value at that point for severance tax purposes. If the product is 
sold from the Satellite that is where production is complete, or if it is sold from the Battery or into 
the pipeline that is were production is complete. 
35. Respondent's position in determining where production is complete is 
consistent with its long-standing practice, which practice was the same prior to a 1990 law change as 
it is today. 
36. The current statute was adopted in 1990. Mr. Simpson had been an employee 
of the Tax Commission at that time and had been involved with the bill to revise the law, although 
he did not attend Senate or House of Representative hearings where the bill was debated. It was his 
testimony that Respondent did not consider the revision to have modified where production was 
considered to be complete, or the use of the contract price at the point of sale. When preparing the 
fiscal note for the bill, Respondent determined that as it pertained to the issue before the 
Commission, there would be no financial impact from the 1990 revision. 
37. Petitioner is not the only taxpayer who has been affected by Respondent's 
policy and practice. There are other similarly situated taxpayers whose severance tax payments have 
been based over the period of many years on the value at the point of sale. 
38. The witnesses differed as to their opinions of where production was complete. 
Mr. Baza thought the oil and gas products could be complete at multiple locations. Mr. Baza 
believed production was complete at the well if the operator chose to sell it there. He believed that 
8 
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the production could also be complete at the Satellite or the Battery if the operator chose to sell the 
oil and gas at those points. Transcript, pp. 233-234. 
39. Mr. Lambert testified he believes that production was complete at the well 
site where it was first marketable even though the operator may choose for economic reasons not to 
sell it there. Transcript, pp. 121-122. 
40. Mr. Simpson testified that he believed the oil and gas production was 
complete when it was in a "marketable condition." Transcript, pp. 256 and 284. However, he 
interpreted "marketable condition" to be where it was actually marketed. Transcript, p. 318. Mr. 
Simpson testified that if the operator sold oil at the well, the production would be complete at the 
well. Transcript, p. 284. Mr. Simpson testified, however, that he did not believe production would 
be complete at the well if the operator chose not to sell at the well, but rather, moved the production 
to a Satellite or Battery for sale. Transcript, pp. 322-323. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
A. Each person owning an interest... in oil or gas produced from a well in the 
state or in the proceeds of the production, shall pay to the state a severance 
tax equal to 4% of the value, at the well, of the oil or gas produced, saved, 
and sold or transported from the field where the substance was produced. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-102(l)(a). 
B. "Value at the well" means the value of oil or gas at the point production is 
completed. Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-101 (19). 
C. "Well or wells" means any extractive means from which oil or gas is 
produced or extracted, located within an oil or gas field, and operated by one 
person. Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-101(20). 
D. "Oil" means crude oil or condensate or any mixture thereof, but does not 
include solid hydrocarbons. 
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(a) "Crude oil" means those hydrocarbons, regardless of 
gravity, that occur naturally in the liquid phase in the reservoir 
and are produced and recovered at the wellhead in liquid 
form. Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-101(8). 
E. "Gas" means natural gas or natural gas liquids or any mixture thereof, but 
does not include solid hydrocarbons. 
(a) "Natural gas" means those hydrocarbons, other than oil 
and other natural gas liquids separated from natural gas, that 
occur naturally in the gaseous phase in the reservoir and are 
produced and recovered at the wellhead in gaseous form. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-101(5). 
ANALYSIS 
This proceeding has been limited to the issue of what point the oil or gas produced 
was "at the well" for the purposes of determining the amount of the severance tax pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. Sec. 59-5-102(l)(a). Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-5-102(l)(a) provides that the amount of 
the severance tax is 4% of "the value, at the well." "At the well," or specifically, "value at the well" 
has been defined by statute to mean the value of oil or gas at the point "production is completed." 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-5-101(19). The question left to the Tax Commission is at what point is 
"production completed." 
Petitioner argues production is completed at the well site, which would provide a 
uniform basis for the severance tax for all producers, whether or not there was further treatment or 
refinement of the product before it was sold. Respondent argues production is completed at the point 
it is actually marketed or sold. Respondent's position reflects its long-standing policy that has 
heretofore been unchallenged. 
10 
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In making its decision in this matter the Commission notes that the legislature has 
expressly defined "at the well" to mean something other than simply the well or well site. The 
statutory definition indicates the determining factor is the point where "production is completed." 
The legislature provided no definition for where "production is completed," tacitly leaving it up the 
Tax Commission, as the agency responsible for administration of the statute, to interpret the phrase. 
There have been no revisions to the relevant statutes since 1990, and in fact it was 
Respondent's understanding that the 1990 revision did not change the point were the oil or gas 
should be valued for purposes of determining the severance tax. Respondent's practice was the same 
prior to the 1990 revision as after the revision and has continued uniformly in the same manner up to 
the date of this hearing. This long-standing practice has been to determine the value for severance 
tax purposes at the point the oil or gas is actually sold. 
Respondent's interpretation of where "production is completed" gives consideration to 
all terms of the statute. It takes into account that "value at the well" has statutorily been defined to 
mean something more than just the value at the well, it has been defined as where "production is 
completed." It is a permissible interpretation and not unreasonable given the language of the statute. 
The courts have noted that past administrative practice is a basis for statutory 
interpretation. The Utah Supreme Court has stated, "In case of any uncertainty or ambiguity in the 
statute, a reasonable administrative interpretation and practice should be given some weight. This is 
particularly true when such administrative interpretation and practice has persisted for a long time 
without any legislative correction or change." Boards of Educ. v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 749 
P.2d 1264, (Utah 1988) citing Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County, 568 P.2d 738, at 741-742. In 
11 
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Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing Division, 814 P.2d 581, 587-589 (Utah 1991) the Utah 
Supreme Court explained: 
In the absence of a discernible legislative intent concerning the 
specific question in issue, a choice among permissible interpretations 
of a statute is largely a policy determination. The agency that has 
been granted authority to administer the statute is the appropriate 
body to make such a determination. Indeed, both the legislative 
history to section 63-46b-16 and our prior caises suggest that an 
appellate court should not substitute its judgment for the agency's 
judgment concerning the wisdom of the agency's policy. 
In the appeal at hand, Respondents' representatives were involved to some extent with 
the legislation and were clearly charged with the duty of administering the statute. They did not 
discern a legislative intent contrary to their practice at that time. 
The Commission notes that Petitioner is not the only party who has been affected by 
Respondent's long standing practice. There are other similarly situated taxpayers who have been 
filing their returns over the past ten or more years in a manner consistent with that policy. If the 
Commission starts issuing refunds to those who have filed a refund request there would be an 
inconsistency with those who have not filed or not filed timely such a request. The Tax Commission 
determines that this is a situation where the Commission should not reverse its long-settled position 
and make a fundamental policy change without following administrative rule making requirements,1 
or without a legislative amendment. 
1
 See Williams v. Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d 773,777 (Utah 1986) 
2
 In addition the Commission notes that consistency of practice is addressed in the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act which provides appellate court relief in situations were an 
agency's actions are contrary to its prior practice. Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii). 
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The Commission acknowledges that Petitioner presents a well-reasoned argument for 
its contention that production is completed for purposes of the statute at the well site. However, 
Respondent's interpretation is also a reasonable and permissible definition, is the one that has been in 
use for more than ten years and has been applied consistently with a number of similarly situated 
taxpayers. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
For purposes of the unique statutory definition of "value at the well" which pertains 
not to "at the well" but instead the point "production is completed," and consistent with the long-
standing practice of the Respondent, "production is completed" at the point of sale. Therefore, 
"value at the well" for the purposes of Utah Code Ann. 59-5-102(1 )(a) is the point of sale. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, Petitioner's appeal, as it pertains to the bifurcated matter at 
issue, is denied. It is so ordered. 
DATED this of April, 2002. 
Jane Phan 
Administrative Law Judge 
13 
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BY ORDER OF THE COMMISSION: 
The Commission has reviewed this case and the undersigned concurs in this decision, 




- i £ CONCURRENCE 
I concur with the majority and additionally submit the following comments to support 
the majority decision. Utah Code Ann. §59-5-101(19) defines "value at the well" as the value of oil 
or gas at the point production is completed. I find this language inherently ambiguous. For example, 
does "value at the well" mean value at the wellhead, where it is capped, as in "at the Christmas 
tree"? Or does it mean, value at the well site, which would include basic separation tanks whether 
mobile or permanent? Or does it mean at the satellite, where further refining takes place? Utah 
Code Ann. §59-5-101 (20) provides some clarification. "Well" is defined as "any extractive means 
from which oil is produced or extracted, located within an oil or gas field, and operated by one 
person." Testimony in this case indicates that oil and gas could be taken at the wellhead or 
Christmas tree, or at the mobile separation tanks, or at the satellite all of which are operated by one 
person. (Tr. At 236.) It should be noted that while the witnesses agreed that satellites were usually 
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could operate a satellite. This suggests that production can be viewed as a process not a physical 
location. Therefore, there is no straightforward understanding of the statute. 
In order to understand legislative intent, one should look to Utah Code Ann. §59-5-
103(1). The preferred method of valuing oil and gas is an arms-length contract for the purchase of 
production at the well. Some of the production was sold in this fashion, but much of it was sold 
further down in the process. Unfortunately, there is no testimony in the record which would cause 
one to find any other applicable method to conform to statutory framework beyond an arms-length 
contact. 
Finally, and in view of the discussion presented above, it appears to be reasonable for 
the Division to have made administrative decisions on how to impose severance taxes in this case. 
The Division appears to be consistent with other government agencies on both the allocation and 
reporting of the volumes of oil. The total volumes are allocated back to individual wells for 
purposes of reporting production to the State Division of Oil, Gas, and Mining. (Tr. At 267.) While 
individual production tests may be done by routing an individual well through a testing mechanism 
for a test period, typically 24 hours, there are no measurement devices at each individual well. (Tr. 
At 178-179.) The Division uses the production figures reported to the Division of Oil, Gas, and 
Mining in conducting severance tax audits. (Tr. At 277.) There are in place arms-length contracts to 
call for the transfer of product in a marketable condition. The production can be deemed to be 
complete, therefore, at the point the product is in the condition described by the contract. The 
contract provides both parties' understanding of what constitutes completed production and contains 
a definite methodology for both determining the price and measuring the volume. The division has 
15 
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correctly determined that an arms-length contract at that point is the preferable method for valuing 




I concur only in the ultimate finding of this limited hearing. That is, that no refund is 
due to the Respondent. With respect to the underlying issue of the definition of value at the well, I 
disagree with the basic findings, and agree with the points made by Commissioner Bruce Johnson in 
his dissenting opinion. 
To reiterate Commissioner Johnson's position, not only the clear statutory language, 
but also the very nature of a severance tax itself, both lead to the conclusion that oil must and can 
only be valued at the wellhead. To interpret the statute otherwise, or to add meaning to it, is beyond 
the purview of this body or the Auditing Division. I see no ambiguity in the statute. Utah Code Ann. 
§59-5-101 (20) specifies a well is defined so as to be "operated by one person" and "located within an 
oil or gas field." Since oil cannot be and is not sold upon immediate emission from the Christmas 
tree, and the satellites involve more than one person, the only possible definition of the well is the 
well; not a satellite or a contract. 
Rather, I believe that this interpretation, albeit correct, should apply only 
prospectively. There is justification to allow for "the decision to be applied nonretroactively... by 
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impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed." See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 
U.S. 97 (1971). The principles of retroactivity and prospectivity, are also discussed within varying 
contexts in a line of U.S. Supreme Court decisions, including Cipriano v. City ofHouma, 395 U.S. 
701 (1969) and American Trucking Assns.t Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990). 
In the present situation both the taxpayer and the Division had been adhering to a 
long-standing practice and interpretation. It was not until 1999, well after even a statutory change in 
1990, that ExxonMobil redetermined its tax calculation based on a new interpretation of the statute. 
Although this interpretation is correct, the State of Utah had come to rely on a source of revenue in 
accordance with a well established and generally accepted practice. I believe that a refund of those 
taxes would place an unfair burden on the State. Moreover, similarly situated taxpayers have also 
been taxed based on their contracts. Therefore, I would find that the practice going forward should 
be changed, and taxes for all taxpayers calculated in accordance with the statutory definition as 
elucidated by the Respondent and Commissioner Bruce Johnson. 
tUt^i 




Appeal No. 00-0901 
DISSENT 
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion of my colleagues. I do not believe it 
is supported by the language of the statute, by rules of statutory construction, by sound administrative 
policy or by fairness. 
It is undisputed that a severance tax is imposed on oil and gas based on the "value at 
the well." Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-5-102(l)(a). "Value at the well" is defined as "the value of oil or 
gas at the point production is completed." Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-5-101(19). "Well" is defined as 
"any extractive means from which oil is produced or extracted, located within an oil or gas field, and 
operated by one person." Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-5-101(20). These provisions would appear to be 
relatively straightforward. The parties agree where the wells are. Oil and gas is "produced or 
extracted" from those wells. That is the point at which valuation for severance taxes should occur. 
The majority opinion does not see it that way. They believe the definition of 
"production," an undefined term in the statute, is ambiguous. They use one possible definition of 
that term to override the statutory directive that the oil and gas production must be valued at the well. 
Instead, they would value some production at the well, if a sale occurred there, other production at 
the satellite, if a sale occurred there, and other production at the battery or the LACT, if a sale 
occurred there. They adopt this position even though all parties agree that a battery cannot be 
operated by one person and cannot be considered a "well" for purposes of the statute.1 Thus, the 
majority's interpretation conflicts with the clear meaning of the statute. 
1
 The witnesses also agreed that satellites were usually operated by more than one person, but Mr. Lambert 
conceded that it was "conceivable" that a single person could operate a satellite. 
18 
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The majority reaches this decision in part because most of the production was not sold 
in an arms-length contract at the well. Rather, it was sold at the LACT. The preferred method of 
valuing oil and gas, set out in Section 59-5-103(1), is an arms-length contract for the purchase of 
production at the well. Some of the production from this field was, in fact, sold pursuant to such 
contracts and the majority, to its credit, uses "value at the well" for those sales. Most of the product, 
however, was not sold at the well, but was sold downstream. The statute provides for that 
eventuality, as well. In the absence of a contract for sale at the well, the state must use the first 
applicable method of three set out in the statute- (1) a non-arms length sale, provided the values are 
equivalent to an arms-length sales price, (2) other reliable public sources of price or market 
information, or (3) the value using the net-back method. The majority disregards this statutory 
framework by interpreting "production" to be complete only when there is an arms-length sale. 
The majority's interpretation does not promote fairness and equity. The severance tax 
is a tax on the "value" of the severed product. It is not a sales tax. Under the majority's ruling, 
however, two barrels of oil from the same field with identical characteristics would be taxed 
differently if their owners had different marketing strategies. The owner who chose to add value by 
further processing its product would be penalized with a higher tax burden.2 Such disparate 
treatment of similarly situated taxpayers should be avoided unless the legislature clearly intends to 
treat them differently. 
2
 The statutory net-back method, which the majority ignores, clearly requires some such processing costs to 
be deducted from a sales price in order to derive taxable value. See Section 59-5-10(7). 
3
 If the legislature chose to make such a distinction, I believe there would be a rational basis to do so, i.e., 
19 
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Finally, I do not believe the majority opinion furthers sound tax administrative 
policy. I agree that we should not lightly undertake a revision to a long-standing administrative 
interpretation. I also agree that most, if not all, taxing statutes are subject to varying interpretations 
and a reasonable interpretation of Jong-standing may indicate legislative acquiescence in that 
interpretation. I do not think, however, that those considerations justify the majority opinion. First, I 
do not think the majority opinion represents a reasonable interpretation of the statute, taken as a 
whole. Second, we have been cited no cases that would indicate that the Division's position was 
ever approved by the Commission. The lack of published opinions or guidance makes it unlikely 
that the legislature could be deemed to be aware of the Division's position. This is a case of first 
impression with the Commission. We have the constitutional duty to administer the tax laws of the 
state. We should not deny the Petitioner a refund just because it is the first taxpayer to challenge the 
Division's interpretation. 
R. Bruce Johnson jf 
Commissioner / / 
NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of this order to file a Request for Reconsideration with the 
Commission pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13. a Request for Reconsideration must allege newly discovered 
evidence or a mistake of law or fact. If you do not file a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission, this order 
constitutes final agency action. You have thirty (30) days after the date of this order to pursue judicial review of this 
order in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601 and 63-46b-13 et. seq. 
JKP/00-0901 fof 
the reliability of an existing arms-length contract would eliminate uncertainty and simplify compliance. But such 
distinctions should be made by the legislature, they should not be implied as a matter of administrative convenience. 
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OF THE UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
FINAL ORDER ON 
RECONSIDERATION 
Appeal No. 00-0901 
Tax Type: Severance Tax 
Judge: Phan 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission upon a Petition for 
Reconsideration, dated May 8,2002, filed by Petitioner as a result of the Commission's Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision, dated April 19,2002 (f,Final Decision"). Respondent 
filed an Opposition to Petitioner's Request for Reconsideration on June 11, 2002. Phillips 
Petroleum, an unrelated party, filed an Amicus Brief in Support of ExxonMobil's Request for 
Reconsideration on May 14, 2002, which was received and reviewed by the Commission. 
Upon review of these submission's the Commission issued an Order Granting 
Reconsideration on June 28, 2002. In the order the Commission requested further briefing and a 
hearing limited to two specific issues. The Commission stated that after the further briefing and 
hearing the Commission would issue a decision which may or may not amend or revise its Final 
Decision in this matter. Both parties submitted the supplemental briefing on August 7, 2002. On 
September 12, 2002, Petitioner filed a Motion to Strike a portion of Respondent's supplemental brief. 
After a telephone conference with the parties and the Administrative Law Judge, on September 17, 
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2002, a Revised Order on Reconsideration was issued in which one of the issues scheduled for 
briefing and hearing, the issue concerning industry practice, was eliminated due to the fact that both 
parties found the issue to be irrelevant and it was considerably difficult for the parties to discover 
and present the evidence requested on that issue. 
A Hearing on Reconsideration was held on September 19, 2002, limited to the 
remaining issue which concerned the burden of proof as it relates to which party prevails in the event 
of a tie vote between the Commissioners. Presiding at the hearing were the four State Tax 
Commissioners and Jane Phan, Administrative Law Judge. David Crapo, of Wood Crapo, LLC, was 
present and represented Petitioner. Clark Snelson, Assistant Attorney General was present and 
represented Respondent. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
Utah Administrative Rule R861-1-29 provides that a Petition for Reconsideration 
"will allege as grounds for reconsideration either a mistake in law or fact, or the discovery of new 
evidence" that could not, with due diligence, have been discovered and produced at trial. Under this 
rule, the Tax Commission may exercise its discretion in granting or denying a Petition for 
Reconsideration. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
The Commission's Final Decision in this matter had been limited to the bifurcated 
factual and legal issue of what point in the production the oil and gas was "at the well" for purposes 
of Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-5-102(l)(a). In a split decision, Commissioners Pam Hendrickson and 
Palmer DePaulis concluded that "at the well," statutorily defined as the point "production is 
- 2 -
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completed," was the point of sale. Commissioner Marc Johnson concurred with the result, in that 
he concluded that no refund should be issued, but he disagreed with Commissioners Hendrickson 
and DePaulis as to the meaning of the value "at the well." Commissioner Bruce Johnson dissented 
from the majority decision, finding for the Petitioner on the issue. 
Upon review of the submissions of the parties during the reconsideration process, 
Commissioners Hendrickson, Depaulis and Bruce Johnson each hereby affirm their original 
positions as expressed in the Final Decision issued in this matter and they make no change or 
modification to Final Decision. However, Commissioner Marc Johnson has reconsidered his 
decision as expressed in the Final Decision. Upon review of the written submissions concerning the 
reconsideration and also the fact that both parties concluded that the issue of industry practice was 
not relevant to the decision, Commissioner Marc Johnson hereby abandons his Concurrence as 
issued in the Final Decision and joins fully in Commissioner Bruce Johnsonfs Dissent. 
The result of this change is a tie vote among the Commissioners with two 
Commissioners finding that the value "at the well" or where "production is completed" is the point 
of sale, and two Commissioners finding that the value "at the well" or where "production is 
completed" is the point where oil and gas is produced or extracted from the well. 
This leads to the issue of which side prevails in the event of a tie among the 
Commissioners. Prior to 1998, the Tax Commission rules were clear as to which party prevailed in 
the event of a tie. Utah Admin. Rule R 861-1A-5(E)(1997) stated in pertinent part, "If the 
Commission vote results in a tie vote on any matter, the position of the petitioning taxpayer will be 
deemed to have prevailed, and the Commission will publish the decision." The Tax Commission 
- 3 -
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rules were amended and revised in 1998 and this provision was eliminated. Utah Admin. Rule 
R861-1 A-21(B) was enacted in 1998 and remains in effect to date. It states, "The party charged with 
the burden of proof or the burden of overcoming a statutory presumption shall prevail only if a 
majority of the participating commissioners rules in that party's favor." It is the Commission's 
conclusion from the briefing and oral argument on this issue that Petitioner is the party charged with 
the burden of proof or the burden of overcoming a statutory presumption. Therefore, Petitioner 
would need three commissioners to find in its favor in order to prevail. 
The origination of this appeal is a request on the part of Petitioner for a refund of 
severance taxes which Petitioner felt it had overpaid. Respondent formally denied the refund request 
and Petitioner filed an appeal of Respondent's denial. The determination of whether Petitioner 
overpaid essentially presented the question of what was the proper amount of the severance tax. This 
raised two issues. The first issue being at what point of the production process are oil and gas 
valued. The second issue, after the appropriate point in production is determined, is what then is the 
value of the oil and gas at that appropriate point. The two issues were bifurcated. Only the first 
issue, at what point are the oil and gas valued, was considered at the Formal Hearing and was the 
subject of the Final Decision. 
Petitioner argues that the first issue is essentially a question of law and that the burden 
of proof on this specific issue is on Respondent. Petitioner acknowledges that it would have the 
burden of proof on the second issue, valuation, as the second issue is essentially an issue of fact. In 
support of this position, Respondent points to Butler v. State Tax Commission, 367 P.2d 852 (Utah 
- 4 -
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1962) and other cases.1 
The Commission disagrees with Petitioner. In Butler, the Utah Supreme Court stated 
that the taxing authority did have the burden of showing that the tax, use tax in that case, was 
applicable. Butler at 854. In the appeal at hand, clearly the severance tax is applicable, that is not 
the dispute. The dispute is what point in the production process should the oil and gas be valued in 
order to determine the amount of the severance tax. 
Petitioner is the party seeking affirmative relief in this matter. If Petitioner had not 
appealed Respondent's denial of the refund request, the denial would have stood as a final action. 
In addition, it is the Commission's conclusion that the issue of what point the oil and gas is to be 
valued for severance tax purposes is a question of both law and fact. 
Based on the forgoing, although Commissioner Marc Johnson vacates his 
Concurrence and joins the Dissent in the Final Decision, the Final Decision in all other respects 
remains unchanged and is affirmed by this order. Respondent prevails from the tie vote of the 
Commissioners. Therefore, the value "at the well" for the purposes of Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-5-
102(l)(a) remains the point of sale as described in the Final Decision. It is so ordered. 
Additional cases cited by Petitioner are Gillette Co- v. 
Department of Treasury, 497 N.W. 2d 595 (MI Ct. App. 1993) cert, 
denied, 513 U.S. 1103 (1995); and DiStefano et al. v. Commission. 
of Revenue, 476 N.E. 2d 161 (MA 1985). 
-5-
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As the Formal Hearing and Final Decision were limited to the one bifurcated issue 
and the second issue concerning valuation is yet unresolved, this matter will be scheduled for further 
administrative proceedings on the second issue. 
DATED this / / day of [kidbcf , 2002 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
Pam Hendrickson / / S " / \&\ 
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AUDITING DIVISION OF THE 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
ORDER OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Appeal No. 00-0901 
Tax Type: Severance Tax 
Judge: Phan 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 31, 2002, Petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis 
that there is no dispute as to any material fact and Respondent was entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. On November 12, 2002, Petitioner filed an Objection to the Division's Motion disputing the 
accuracy of some of the alleged facts set forth therein. On that same day Petitioner also filed a Cross 
Motion for Summary Judgment indicating that summary judgment was appropriate if the factual 
basis for the motion was corrected to be consistent with the prior decisions of the Commission in this 
matter. 
Petitioner had originally filed its Petition for Redetermination in this matter to appeal 
Respondent's denial of a refund request. The appeal presented two issues before the Commission. 
The first was what point was oil and gas "production completed" for purposes of Utah Code Ann. 
Sec. 59-5-101(19). The second issue, once the appropriate point was determined, was what was the 
value of the oil or gas at that point. These two issues were bifurcated and the parties presented the 
first issue before the Commission at a Formal Hearing, The Tax Commission issued its decision on 
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the first issue on April 19, 2002, holding in its Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Final 
Decision ("Final Order") as follows: 
'"production is completed1 at the point of sale. Therefore, Value at the 
wellf for purposes of Utah Code Ann. 59-5-102)(l)(a) is the point of 
sale." 
Final Order, p. 13. Petitioner subsequently filed a Request for Reconsideration and on October 11, 
2002, the Commission issued its Final Order on Reconsideration which upheld its ruling on the first 
issue. 
Following the Commission's Final Order on the first issue, the point where 
'production is completed', the only remaining issue before the Commission was the second issue of 
what is the value of the oil and gas at that point. Although Petitioner objected to Respondent's 
characterization of parts of the Commission's decision, Petitioner agrees that based on the 
Commission's actual ruling on the first issue, summary judgment on the second issue is appropriate. 
In considering the second issue, the only relevant fact in determining if Petitioner is 
entitled to its requested refund is whether the values claimed on Petitioner's original returns during 
the audit period were based on the value of the oil and gas at the point of sale or some other point. 
In the Motion for Summary Judgement, Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and the 
accompanying memoranda, there is no dispute as to the fact that the production values Petitioner 
reported on its original severance tax filings, and for which it paid the severance tax during the 
period at issue, were based on the sale prices received at the various points of sale. The parties do 
not dispute the values attributed to the production at that point. Based on the standard determined 
by the Commission in its Final Order, that the oil and gas should be valued at the point of sale, 
- 2 -
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Petitioner is not entitled to its requested refund and Summary Judgment against Petitioner is 
appropriate, fully resolving this appeal. 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, and incorporating the Final Order on the bifurcated issue, 
the Commission finds that Summary Judgment against Petitioner is appropriate and no refund is due. 
This is the final resolution of all matters in this appeal. It is so ordered. 
DATED this i day of 2002. 
Janj£ Plian I 
Administrative Law Judge 
BY ORDER OF THE COMMISSION. 
The undersigned have reviewed this motion and concur in this decision. 
DATED this lj day of \y?C&W^A 2002-
Pam Hendrickson Palmer DePaulis 
Commission Chair Commissioner 
- 3 -
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PARTIAL CONCURRENCE AND DISSENT 
The undersigned Commissioners concur in part and dissent in part. We continue to 
disagree with the majority decision in the Final Order on the first bifurcated issue and our dissent 
in that Final Order is incorporated herein by reference. Because the Commission's Final Order has 
determined that the appropriate valuation point is the point of sale, and that Final Order now 
represents the law of this case, we concur that summary judgment is appropriate on the second issue 
because there is no dispute as to the value of the oil and gas at that point. 
R. Bruce Johnso^ Marc B. Jo 
Commissioner/^ Commission* 
Notice of Appeal Rights: You have twenty (20) days after the date of this order to file a Request for 
Reconsideration with the Commission pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-13. A Request for 
Reconsideration must allege newly discovered evidence or a mistake of law or fact. If you do not file a 
Request for Reconsideration with the Commission, this order constitutes final agency action. You have thirty 
(30) days after the date of this order to pursue judicial review of this order in accordance with Utah Code Ann. 
§§59-1-601 and 63-46b-13 et. seq. 
JKP/00-0901.SJ2 
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
j uN;; 31S90 
• u * :«••.:•«,' ^.'vision 
Petitioners, 
v. 
AUDITING DIVISION OP THE 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. ) 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND FINAL DECISION 
Appeal No. 83-1676 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Conunission far 
a formal hearing on Wednesday, May 24, 1989. Hearing the matter 
for and on behalf of the Tax Commission were R. H. Hansen, 
Chairman; Jo© p. Pacheco, Commissioner; and G. Blaine Davis, 
Commissioner and Presiding Officer. Present and representing the 
we r e feHHBHHHBHHBIHBH| 
H ^ H | Present and representing the Respondent was Lee A. Dever, 
Assistant Attorney General. 
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the 
hearing, the Tax Commission hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
I« The tax in question is occupation tax. 
34 DIV20 
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2. The audit period in question i s January l, 1980 
through December 31, 1986. 
3 . 
(hereinafter co l lec t ive ly referred to as Petitioners) are separate 
corporations, each incorporated under the laws of Delaware. Each 
a subsidiary of ^ H | ^ ^ | ^ | ^ H | 
4. The Petitioners owned a number of oi l and gas wells 
located within Utah. Some of those were located in what is 
to as t h @ ^ B H | F l G l d ' 
T h e
 ^ ^ ^ H H ^ I ^ ^ H Field i s a gas-condensate 
reservoir. Tne natural gas liquids (NGL's) produced from this 
field are delivered to a common carrier pipeline which, in turn, 
the ^°flHBIHHI^HHl^HHIHHHi 
6
' Pursuant to a contract entered into by the 
a n d ^ ^ H H I H H H i flflHHHi 
^^^^^^• • i^M^B' flFJVMa<?ree3. to purchase 
the NGL's produced by the Petitioners. The price paid b y f l ^ 
^ • w a s based on the average monthly prices for such products as 
published bv the flU^H^HHlA .r. 
1 v
 w^mmmm^m Price information Service. Prom 
that price, deductions were made for transportation, fractionation 
and marketing fees to arrive at the actual price paid by fl^M 
to the Pet i t ioners . ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ " 
7. The amount of occupation tax paid by the Petitioners 
for the o i l and gas produced from t h e l f l | ^ |
 F i e l d v a 6 
based upon the amount of money received f r o m f l B u n d e r
 t h e t e r m s 
of the contract. 
- 2 -
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
For purposes of computing the occupation tax, the value 
of oi l or gas at the well shall be the value established under a 
bona fide contract for the purchase of the same, or in the absence 
of a contract, by the value at the wall establ ished by the United 
States for royalty purposes (Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-67(2) (b)(i>). 
DECISION AND ORDER 
In the present case, the Petitioners contend that the 
value at the well of the gas and oil'removed at the H H H H B 
Field for purposes of determining the amount of occupation tax to 
be paid is the net price paid ^ y H H I f a r those products 
under the terms of the contract. 
The Commission i s not persuaded by the arguments of the 
Petitioners. Section 59-5-67(3) states: 
Any contract between a parent and a subsidiary-company, 
or between companies wholly or partially owned by a 
common parent, or between companies otherwise af f i l ia ted 
that specif ies the value of minerals sha l l not be deemed 
bona fide unless the value of minerals spec i f ied i s 
proportionate to the mineral's reasonable fa ir cash 
value, in the event of a controversy, the tax commission 
shall determine the fair cash value of the mineral. 
Petit ioners argue that under this subsection, the 
contract between them a n d ^ ^ ^ ^ H H ^ H B i s a bona fide 
contract because the value established by the contract i s 
proportionate to the fair market value. That, however, i s only 
half of the t e s t to determine whether or not a contract i s bona 
fide for purposes of S 59-5-67. The other half of the test 
- 3 -
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is found in S 59-5-67, which requires the value of oil and gas to 
be set "at the well". It is this requirement that the 
Petitioners' pricing scheme fails to satisfy. 
Under the clear and literal meaning of § 59-5-67, "at the 
well" means the gross value of those products at the point o T 
their removal from the well, it does not mean the price obtained 
at some point downstream after deducting costs incurred for 
transportation, fractionation, and marketing fees, The position 
of the Petitioners also does not account for "shrinkage," or 
product which is lost in the process, because the quantities which 
are sold are smaller than the quantities which come through the 
meters at the top of the wells. Therefore, the Commission finds 
that the contract relied upon by the Petitioners to establish the 
value of the oil and gas produced at the wells was not a bona fide 
contract within the meaning of § 59-5-103. 
Having so decided, the Commission next turns to the issue 
of what the correct method of valuing of the oil and gas is. 
Again, § 59-5-103 provides the statutory guideline to be followed 
in making that determination. 
Under § 59-5-103, if a bona fide contract for the 
purchase of production of oil or gas does not exist, the value of 
the oil or gas at the well is that which is established by the 
United States for royalty purposes (federal royalty method). From 
the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, it appears 
that although there was a federal lease within the field, which 
could have been used to establish the federal royalty price, the 
existence of that lease was not known at the time of the audit, 
Thus, the federal royalty method was not applied. 
-4- DIV23 
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Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission finds that 
the correct method for determining the value of the oil and gas 
removed from the veils located within t h e ^ ^ m m B B B B 
Field is the federal royalty method. The Auditing Division is 
hereby ordered to adjust its audit and to compute the tax due 
based upon the federal'royalty method. It is so ordered. 
DATED this 7*^ day of Q>. ZxJLWJL 1990. 
BY ORDER OP THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
Chairman 
foe B. Pacheco 
Commissioner 
G. Blaine Davis 
Commissioner 
NOTICE: You have ten (10) days after the date of the final—a*-
to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days after 
the date of final order to file in Supreme Court a petition for 
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